Saving Nigeria from insurgency wars without end

BY LEKAN OLAYIWOLA

Nigeria dances between the war of bullets and that of belief; between crises defined by the intensity of violence, and those defined by the erosion of meaning. But beneath the sophisticated weaponry of insurgents, the sprawling kidnap-for-ransom networks, and the expanding territories of bandit enclaves lies a subtler, deadlier adversary: a collapsing reservoir of public trust in the Nigerian state.

More than the firepower of insurgents, it is this trust deficit that’s shaping the trajectory of Nigeria’s insecurity. It determines whether intelligence reaches the military in time; communities cooperate with security agencies, or local youth choose the path of insurgency, vigilantism, or neutrality.

Nigeria’s security travails are thus not merely operational, but profoundly psychological, political, moral, and international. The state must restore trust to win the war, yet cannot win the war without trust. Understanding this paradox with clarity and honesty is perhaps the most urgent task before Nigeria’s leaders today.

Trust as National Security Infrastructure

In counterinsurgency doctrine, the population is the centre of gravity, not territory, firepower or even ideology.  Yet, according to the Africa Polling Institute’s 2025 Social Cohesion Survey, 83% of Nigerians report little or no trust in the federal government, 82% distrust the National Assembly, and 79% distrust the judiciary. The Nigeria Social Cohesion Index stands at 46.8%, below the 50-point benchmark for a cohesive society. This isn’t simply political disaffection, but a civil-military emergency.

Trust determines whether citizens alert authorities to suspicious movements in their villages; locals give sanctuary to militants or cooperate with security forces; communities intercept violent plots or stay silent out of fear or cynicism. When trust collapses, vital human intelligence is lost. And no surveillance drone can replace the instincts, eyes, and courage of communities who believe the state is on their side. Once trust collapses, the state becomes blind, deaf, and slow.

How Trust Deficit Fuels Insecurity

Insurgents as political actors read environments with a predator’s sensitivity; they recognise state weakness in public feeling and exploit trust deficits by filling vacuums in underserved communities and weaponising fear to suffocate intelligence reporting. Insurgents provide rough order— extortionist, brutal— but present enough to win passive acceptance, turning state failure into psychological warfare, and exploiting distrust to recruit.

If reporting insurgents guarantees retaliation and does not guarantee protection, people will stay silent. An ambush on a brigadier general, delayed military response to a school kidnapping, and a contradictory government statement become evidence in the insurgent propaganda of state weakness.

In many communities, the choice is not ideological but survival. Youth who believe the state offers no future are more vulnerable to radicalisation, coercion, or opportunistic alignment. Nigeria’s security crisis escalates so quickly after each attack. The psychological shock ripples across the country, shrinking trust and widening the insurgent opportunity space.

The Dilemma Facing Nigeria

Nigeria faces a strategic paradox in restoring trust while also defeating violent groups quickly. But each imperative complicates the other. A slow response validates the insurgents’ claim of the government’s weakness; an aggressive one fuels civilian anger. Every move to regain legitimacy risks worsening legitimacy. More than a tactical challenge, insecurity is a governance-trust failure.

Trust is not won in press statements or by successful raids. It is won in quiet, repeated, predictable patterns of protectiveness: schools reopen and remain open, markets function without fear, roads are consistently safe, security forces respond in minutes, not hours, abuses are punished transparently, communication aligns with reality, and local leaders feel heard, not bypassed.

Insurgents design their attacks to destroy predictability: interrupt schools, halt farming, shut markets, and burn transportation routes. They target the rhythms of daily life because their goal is to kill public confidence, not just people. This creates a strategic time asymmetry. Bandits win fast through disruption; the state slowly through consistency.

Lessons from Colombia and the Philippines

Colombia’s conflict with FARC lasted over fifty years. The turning point came with legitimacy-centred reforms. After the 2016 peace agreement, Bogotá deployed an integrated model in conflict zones known as Zonas Futuro, linking security with governance, justice, infrastructure, and social investment. Colombia discovered something Nigeria must internalise: you cannot defeat insurgency without the presence of teachers, judges, health workers, and predictable local governance. Colombia’s most successful interventions were those that created accountability loops between communities and state agencies..

The Philippines’ peace with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) succeeded not because the military won outright, but because the state reframed its legitimacy crisis. The creation of the BARMM was not a political concession, but a legitimacy restoration mechanism. The agreement integrated local ownership of governance structures, international monitoring teams, and civil society oversight. The legitimacy gains have endured despite political turbulence.

The International Blind Spot

Successive governments have treated insurgency as a military issue inside Nigerian borders. Yet militants survive largely because of transnational criminal-financial ecosystems that Nigeria cannot dismantle alone. Without a coordinated foreign policy to cut off external funding, the insurgency remains self-sustaining.

Nigeria’s foreign policy should be repurposed to attack the financial infrastructure of insurgents, including informal banking networks across the Sahel, arms trade in Libya/Sudan, gold, cattle and scrap metal smuggling in the region and cryptocurrency laundromats offshore.

Nigeria must spearhead a global pressure campaign that includes targeting foreign arms brokers and lobbying the UN/EU/US to impose sanctions on specific individuals and companies fueling conflict. Sign bilateral agreements with Gulf States and North African governments (Algeria, Egypt, UAE) to monitor arms trafficking and freeze suspect wire transfers. Pursue a West African FATF-style task force to track illicit financial flows.

Focus must shift from internal solutions alone because 40% to 50% of insurgent supply chains (arms, food, fuel, motorcycles, and mercenaries) flow through porous borders and corrupt networks outside Nigeria’s jurisdiction. Diplomacy is needed to shut those arteries. Revamp MNJTF with automatic intelligence exchange, not ad-hoc reports, patrol smuggling routes, and reduce cross-border pursuit off-limits to 2km.

On the Home front

The state must reimagine itself not as a distant power, but as a guardian of dignity.  Legitimacy is emotional before it is administrative. People must feel protected to be protected. This requires a government that acknowledges mistakes, security forces trained in restraint and relational policing, active listening to communities, symbolic acts of reconciliation, accountability for abuses and investment in everyday life, not just major infrastructure.

A reopened school in Zamfara is a counterinsurgency victory. A functioning clinic in Borno is a legitimate victory. A transparent investigation into military misconduct is a moral victory.

Each of these is as strategically critical as clearing a forest stronghold. An exemplary prosecution of a terrorism sponsor signals seriousness in the war against banditry.

Nigeria must adopt a strategy that treats trust as mission-critical. This means placing communities at the centre of security architecture, coordinating civilian, military, and developmental efforts in conflict-affected areas, institutionalising rapid-response security units, and deploying teachers, judges, and health personnel alongside soldiers.

It entails ensuring justice is swift, transparent, and visible; empowering local leaders and vigilante groups with oversight; and rehumanising the national communication strategy. It requires rebuilding the social contract—the belief that the Nigerian state is worth cooperating with.

Lekan Olayiwola is a peace & conflict researcher/policy analyst. He can be reached via [email protected]