The growing threat to democracy in West Africa

BY JOSEPH PHILIP

The 2024 presidential election in Senegal was widely celebrated as a triumph of youth leadership and democratic renewal. A young opposition figure rose to national prominence and ultimately won the presidency, offering hope in a region facing prolonged democratic backsliding. Yet beneath the euphoria lay a troubling precedent: the disqualification of major opposition contenders from participating in the race. At the time, many dismissed these exclusions as internal political manoeuvres unique to Senegal’s context. But the events that have unfolded since then show that the practice is fast becoming a regional democratic crisis.

In 2025, Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau witnessed similar patterns. In both countries, leading opposition candidates and parties were removed from the ballot through judicial rulings or administrative decisions that raised more questions than answers. What should have been competitive elections reflecting the will of the people became contests with artificially limited choices. This trend has now reached the Republic of Benin, where the main opposition party has been disqualified from the April presidential election—long before campaigns even begin.

A Disturbing Pattern Across the Region

This wave of disqualification is more than a series of isolated national events; it represents a dangerous regional pattern in which incumbents and dominant political actors use state institutions to restrict who can contest elections. Such practices strike at the heart of democratic participation—an essential principle enshrined in both the ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (2001) and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG, 2007).

These frameworks guarantee citizens the right not only to vote but to choose freely among competing visions for national leadership. By deliberately narrowing the field of contenders, states undermine the very essence of popular participation and the legitimacy of electoral outcomes.

Article 1 of the ECOWAS Protocol and Articles 4 and 17 of ACDEG affirm that elections must allow genuine political competition. The right to vote becomes hollow when the state interferes with citizens’ freedom to choose by excluding viable opposition candidates. Even when procedural elements of an election are intact—registration, polling, collation—popular participation is fundamentally compromised if meaningful alternatives are removed from the ballot. What appears on the surface as a “peaceful election” may in fact be a managed democracy, where the outcome is shaped long before citizens go to the polls.

Weaponising Institutions to Shape Outcomes

In several of the recent cases, electoral commissions and courts have been drawn into political battles, issuing rulings that favour incumbents or weaken challengers. This undermines public trust in the independence of institutions that are meant to protect, not restrict, democratic choice. The normative frameworks of ECOWAS and the AU require such bodies to operate impartially, transparently, and in the service of the people. When institutions become tools in political engineering, the election ceases to be a reflection of the popular will.

While ECOWAS and the AU traditionally respond to coups and military takeovers, the systematic exclusion of opposition actors constitutes a quiet, constitutional manipulation that can be equally destructive. ACDEG recognises that tampering with electoral laws and processes to entrench incumbents is a form of unconstitutional change of government. These disqualifications, therefore, represent early warning signs that democracy in West Africa is entering a new and dangerous phase—one where elections remain regular, but their meaning is eroded. 

The Risk of a Normative Collapse and A Call for Regional Leadership and Bold Reform

If this pattern continues without regional consequence, it threatens to reverse two decades of progress in building democratic norms across West Africa. Other leaders may be emboldened to adopt similar tactics, knowing that the regional sanctions architecture remains politically constrained. Over time, this can create a culture where electoral competition is optional, opposition is delegitimised, and popular participation is redefined to suit those in power.

The recent declaration of a State of Emergency by the President of the ECOWAS Commission offers a critical opportunity—not only to address the resurgence of coups and rising insecurity across the region, but also to confront these deeper, structural threats to democracy that rarely make the headlines. If ECOWAS is sincere about restoring stability and preventing further democratic backsliding, it must be courageous in its introspection and acknowledge that weakened institutions, manipulated electoral processes, and shrinking civic space are as dangerous to the region’s future as armed rebellions or unconstitutional takeovers.

This moment demands bold leadership. The issues undermining electoral integrity cannot be treated as peripheral or politically sensitive; they must be confronted with honesty and urgency. ECOWAS already has the tools—the challenge is to use them decisively.

Part of this effort must include fast-tracking the long-pending review of the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. The current protocol, adopted in 2001, no longer fully reflects the political realities or the sophisticated ways incumbents now manipulate electoral systems. The reviewed protocol—once finalised—must address existing gaps, strengthen enforcement mechanisms, and provide clearer norms on electoral justice, institutional independence, candidacy rights, and political participation.

Adopting an updated Supplementary Protocol would send a powerful message: that West Africa is not only aware of the evolving threats to democracy, but is prepared to act. Without such reforms, ECOWAS risks remaining reactive—responding to crises after the damage is already done.

West Africa stands at a crossroads. The strength of its democratic future depends on whether regional institutions, civil society, and political leaders can confront emerging threats with clarity and conviction. Democracy is weakened not only when ballots are stolen, but when choices are silently taken away long before election day. If sovereignty is to remain with the people, then the people must have genuine choices—and ECOWAS must rise to the moment.

Joseph U. Philip, governance programme coordinator at the GEJ Foundation, can be contacted via [email protected]